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RECENT DECISIONS
house for another house of like kind, i.e., held for investment pur-
poses, no gain will be recognized from such transaction. While the
property received in the exchange must be held "either for productive
use in trade or business or for investment",' 7 no authority has been
found to indicate that such use must be of any definite duration. Con-
ceivably the length of time needed to evict a tenant may be a sufficient
holding period and then the taxpayer would have the new residence
and also have avoided recognition of gain on the transaction.
The reader is cautioned to bear in mind the doctrine of Gregory
v. Helvering," where the Supreme Court stated:
"... the question for determination is whether what was
done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the
statute intended."
As Judge Learned Hand pointed out in the Circuit Court decision in
the same case:
".... it does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a
transaction, not even though the facts answer the dictionary
definitions of each term used in the statutory definition."' 9
The Commissioner, if he attempted to overthrow such a scheme, could
also rely on the Century Electric Co. case where the Court said:
"The transaction here involved may not be separated into its
component parts for tax purposes. Tax consequences must de-
pend on what actually was intended and accomplished rather
than on the separate steps taken to reach the desired ends."'0
The Commissioner and the courts might well find that this scheme
accomplished an end not intended by the section in question.
RICHARD T. BECKER
Labor Law-Enforceability of Hot Cargo Clause-A shipment
of doors, manufactured by the Paine Lumber Company of Oshkosh,
Wisconsin and purchased from the Sand Door and Plywood Company,
were delivered to a hospital construction site on which Harvsted and
Jensen were general contractors. A few days later, on August 17,
1954, Fliesher, a business agent of petitioner, Local 1976, visited the
site and informed Harvsted and Jensen's foreman, a member of the
local, that the doors were non-union and could not be hung. The fore-
man then ordered the employees to stop handling the objectionable
doors and work on them ceased. The general contractors were then
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use
in trade or business or for investment . . . is exchanged solely for
property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in trade or
business or for investment.
1 Ibid.
18 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), at p. 469.
19 Ielvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2nd Cir. 1934) at p. 819.20 Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951).
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notified of the cessation of work on these goods. Petitioner's business
agent relied upon the collective bargaining agreement between the
union and the general contractor which contained a "hot cargo" clause
which provided that "workmen shall not be required to handle non-
union material." As a result of this work stoppage, Sand Door filed
a petition with the National Labor Relations Board charging that
Local 1976 had violated §8(b) (4) (A)' of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act of 1947 in that it had induced and encouraged Halvsted
and Jensen's employees to engage in a strike or concerted refusal to
work with the purpose of forcing their employers to cease doing busi-
ness with Paine. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced
the Board's cease and desist order.2 On Certiorari to the Supreme
Court,3 the Board's finding of an unfair practice was affirmed in a
six to three decision and directions were given to enforce the cease
and desist order. It was held that the hot cargo clause was a valid
agreement in the collective bargaining contract but that it could only
be enforced by appeals to the employer. In the absence of employer
consent at the time of dispute, a union's order to employees to refuse
to handle goods covered by the clause is a violation of the Act.4 In
companion cases decided on the same issue and within the scppe of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, it was held that the "hot cargo"
clause was not a defense to an unfair labor practice charge either by a
union having such a clause in their collective bargaining agreement5 or
by a union which, though not a party to such an agreement, was under
contract with an employer who had such an agreement with another
union.6
An employer who signs a hot cargo provision in his collective bar-
gaining agreement with a union agrees that the workers covered by
such agreement need not handle goods which are objectionable to the
union. These goods are labeled "hot" either because they come from
a non-union company or a company involved in a labor dispute. In
the absence of such a provision, a union which ordered its members
to refrain from handling such hot cargo would be guilty of secondary
boycott in violation of the Labor Management Relations Act of 19 47.,
In the principal case it was the union's position that the act does not
1 Labor M\anagement Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) 61 STAT. 140, 29 U.S.C.
§158(b) (4) (A) (1947).
2 Sand Door Plywood Company, 113NLRB 1210, 36LRRM 1478; aff'd sub. noma.
N.L.R.B. v. Local 1976 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, A F of L, 241 F. 2d 147 (1957).
3 Certiorari Granted by Supreme Court of the United States, 355 U.S. 808
(1957).
4 Local 1976 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America et al
vs. N.L.R.B., 78 S. Ct. 1011 (1958).
5Machinists Union Local 886 vs. N.L.R.B., 78 Ct. 1011 (1958).
6General Drivers Union Local 1956 vs. N.L.R.B., 78 S. Ct. 1011 (1958).
-61 STAT. 140, 29 U.S.C. 158 (b) (4) (A) (1957).
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prohibit all secondary boycotts but only those in which one employer
is forced to stop dealing with another. The element of coercion, the
union argued, is not present where the employer voluntarily agrees
in his collective bargaining agreement that his employees need not
handle certain goods. The union, far from calling a strike at the time
the objectionable articles appear, would thus, by this reasoning, be
merely informing the employees of their rights as granted by the em-
ployer in advance of the dispute. The court rejected this theory and
held that the prior acquiescence of an employer did not eliminate the
possibility of coercion where a union instructs its members not to
handle hot cargo. The Supreme Court stated:
"A union is free to persuade an employer to engage in a
boycott, so long as it refrains from the specifically prohibited
means of coercion through inducement of employees.""
It was the opinion of the majority that the secondary employer who is
a party to a hot cargo agreement retains complete freedom of choice
as to whether he will abide by the agreement. If the union appeals
to the employees rather than the employer it is guilty of an unfair
labor practice.
In this decision the Supreme Court has clarified what has been de-
scribed as the most vexatious problem to arise under the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act? In the first administrative and judicial pro-
nouncement on this problem, it was held that the hot cargo contract
was a valid agreement which could be enforced by the union with or
without the present consent of the employer since the advance consent
embodied in the clause eliminated the element of coercion.10 In the
present case the Supreme Court rejected the Conway Doctrine on en-
forceability but made clear that while the union was guilty of an unfair
labor practice for its activities at the time of the strike, the clause itself
was not in violation of the Act. The distinction between the validity
of the agreement per se and its enforceability at the time of dispute is
an important one since there has been a tendency on the part of the
Board and some of the courts to treat the hot cargo clause as invalid
at its inception. Basically three arguments have been set forth by those
who argue that the hot cargo clause is invalid. In Sand Door and
Plywood Company, the view was expressed by one member of the
Board that,
".. -no amount of ingenuity can change the simple fact
that the 'hot cargo' contract is nothing more than a device to
immunize in advance the very conduct which Congress in re-
s Supra note 4.
9 The Supreme Court and the N.L.R.B., an address by member Joseph A.
Jenkens, July 15, 1957; 40 L.R.R.11. 98, 110.
10 Conway Express Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949), aff'd sub. non. Rabouin v.
N.L.R.B., 195 F. 2d 906 (1952).
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sponse to dire public need sought to eliminate."" [Emphasis
supplied].
Although it is true that in the debate surrounding the passage of
the Act, the secondary boycott was looked upon with disfavor, 12 the
Supreme Court warned against any attempts to find a sweeping pro-
hibition of all secondary boycotts in the Act as finally passed by Con-
gress. The court had likewise rejected the contention that
"... if Congress intended to protect ... primary employers,
from the effect of secondary boycotts, and I believe it did so in-
tend, other parties can not insulate themselves by contract from
such statutory prohibitions."' 3
In refuting both these contentions the Court pointed out that Congress
"... specifically forbids a union to induce employees to re-
fuse to handle goods for their employers when an object is to
force him or another to cease doing business with some third
party.'
4
Essential to the Court's analysis is the statutory requirement of force,
since without coercion of the employer by the union there is no viola-
tion of the act. Thus it follows that neither the public at large nor
primary employers can be assured of protection by §8(b) (4) (A)
against voluntary boycotts of secondary employers.
A stronger case against the basic validity of the hot cargo clause
was stated by two members of the Board in Genuine Parts Company."
In that case, members Leedom and Jenkins were of the opinion that
the hot cargo clause was invalid in all situations concerning carriers
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.'6 To this the Supreme Court
answered that the employer's freedom of choice in business dealings,
regardless of whether or not he is engaged in common carriage, was
left unrestricted by the Labor Management Relatioss Act. In looking
to the activity of the Interstate Commerce Commission in this area,
the court pointed out that the Galveston Truck Line decision 7 did not
pass on the validity of the clause as such but clarified a carrier's duties
in a given situation. The Supreme Court noted that the National
Labor Relations Board should not presume to make a general rule
under the statute governing another administrative tribunal, especially
where that tribunal, the Interstate Commerce Commission, has not it-
self felt it necessary to form such rule as a general policy.
11113 N.L.R.B. 1210, 36 L.R.R.M. 1478.
"293 CONG. REc. A-1222, 4198-4199, 4838 (1947); SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 8, 22 (1947).
"3Douds vs. Mild Drivers and Dairy Employees, 248 F. 2d 534, 40 L.R.R.M.
2669 (1957).
2 Supra note 4.
15C.C.H. LAB. REP. 54, 979; 119 N.L.R.B. No. 53.
3654 STAT. 919 49 U.S.C. §§301-327 (1940).
'7 Galveston Truck Lines Corp. vs. Ada Motor Lines, Inc. et al,-I.C.C.-,No.
MC-C1922 (December 6,1957).
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CONCLUSION
In spite of the restrictions placed on the hot cargo clause by the
Supreme Court, the clause still has considerable vitality. Union rep-
resentatives, especially in the trucking and construction fields, will con-
tinue to utilize it to preserve their traditional sentiment against work-
ing with non-union articles or personnel. Two factors tend to support
this conclusion. Primarily, few secondary employers will dishonor
their collective bargaining agreement when they must later bargain
with the same representatives of what is usually, though not always,
a union shop. Another consideration which must be developed more
fully by union leadership is the fact that only the freedom to strike
is denied the union by §8(b) (4) (A); the union retains its other
powers to persuade the employer to abide by his contract. To these
employers who seek to negate the affect of an existing hot cargo
clause more latitude is given. Since the union must appeal directly to
the secondary employer to enforce the provision, his decision in most
circumstances will control as to whether there will be a valid secondary
boycott. Assuming that the union makes its request properly and the
there is acquiescence, the primary employer's only recourse will be
found in common carrier situations. In such cases the primary em-
ployer may, relying on Galveston,"' claim before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission that secondary employer is engaging in a dis-
criminatory practice.
RICHARD PERRY
Federal Taxation-Refund Suit-Full Payment Prerequisite-
Taxpayer suffered losses on the sale of certain commodities and
futures and reported them as ordinary losses. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue characterized the transactions as capital losses, levy-
ing a deficiency assessment in the amount of $28,908.60, including in-
terest. After making two payments totaling $5,058.54, taxpayer sub-
mitted a claim for refund of that amount which was disallowed by the
Commissioner. Petitioner then challenged the correctness of the de-
ficiency by bringing the present suit for refund under 28 U.S.C.
§1346 (a) (1). The United States moved to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. The District Court for the District of Wyoming felt that
because petitioner had not paid the full amount of the deficiency he
should not maintain the action. But because the Court of Appeals
had not resolved the question, the case was decided on its merits for
the United States. On taxpayer's appeal to the Court of Appeals for
the 10th Circuit, the judgment was vacated and the case remained with
instructions to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a claim.
18 Ibid.
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